Shanghai will host the World AI Conference from July 17 to 20, drawing more than 1,400 delegates and 3,000 exhibits. The event’s focus extends beyond the technology on display to the narrative China is crafting around global AI governance.
The conference bears the theme “Intelligent Partners, Co‑create the Future,” yet China positions itself not merely as a participant but as the architect of the emerging AI order. This distinction carries weight, especially after U.S. export controls have limited China’s access to advanced chips. Beijing now uses Shanghai as a platform to challenge Western sanctions and promote a new World AI Cooperation Organization that could steer Global South positions at the United Nations on its terms.
As AI reshapes regional power dynamics, policymakers in Southeast Asia must consider the strategic implications of China’s expanding influence. The country’s current hardware constraints do not deter it from asserting leadership; instead, it leverages its narrative to signal intent to the world.
Beijing is simultaneously pursuing domestic chip self‑sufficiency while exporting dependence through 6G networks, facial‑recognition systems, and open‑weight AI models such as DeepSeek and Qwen. These models are positioned to become default architectures for nations priced out of Western alternatives.
Huawei already occupies critical positions within the AI stacks of several Southeast Asian governments. The establishment of a China‑Southeast Asia AI forum and a new China‑Laos AI innovation center further extends Beijing’s footprint.
While low‑cost AI models and digital infrastructure offer undeniable appeal, they risk becoming strategic dependencies as governments and critical industries become locked into foreign‑controlled AI ecosystems.
Cybersecurity agencies in the United States, Australia, and Europe have repeatedly warned that reliance on Chinese telecommunications infrastructure poses supply‑chain and national‑security risks, prompting restrictions on equipment from Huawei and ZTE. For the Philippines and its regional neighbors, the challenge lies not only in adopting AI affordably but also in recognizing that the risk is built into the architecture itself.
South‑East Asia possesses guiding principles through ASEAN and other regional bodies, which provide non‑binding soft law. However, the application of these principles is uneven, with Singapore boasting a mature strategy while Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar have only begun to engage with AI governance.
Fragmentation creates a vulnerability that China’s model is designed to exploit. To counter this, the region should first convert its soft‑law guidance into a binding regional floor on AI infrastructure security, establishing minimum standards for telecom and cloud vendors regardless of origin.
Second, member states should develop interoperable regulatory sandboxes, enabling AI systems to be tested against common compliance benchmarks instead of navigating 12 fragmented national frameworks. Third, the Philippines should advance a legislative proposal for a centralized National Artificial Intelligence Council, offering this governance model as a template for other Southeast Asian nations.
These steps do not necessitate confrontation with Beijing. Rather, they require the region to treat digital sovereignty as deliberate infrastructure, built before dependency sets the terms.
While Shanghai will spend four days proclaiming global leadership in AI, Southeast Asia must decide whether to merely observe or to set its own terms. The region already has the frameworks; what remains is the will to bind them before dependencies become entrenched.
