Imagine two nearly identical systems designed to confirm who you are. One safeguards the process of receiving a driver’s license, a vital form of identification. The other? It’s used to verify voters before they’re allowed to participate in our elections. The chilling truth is, one works flawlessly, while the other is demonstrably flawed. And it’s the flawed system protecting our democracy.
Across the nation, state Motor Vehicle Administrations – the DMVs, MVDs, and similar agencies – rely on a service called SSOLV to verify driver’s license applicants. The process is straightforward: an applicant provides their information, including their nine-digit Social Security number, date of birth, and name. This data travels securely to the Social Security Administration and back, providing a swift and accurate confirmation of identity.
Now, consider the system used for voter registration: HAVV. It’s almost a mirror image of SSOLV, utilizing the same state MVAs and the same secure network, AAMVAnet, to reach the Social Security Administration. However, a critical difference exists. HAVV only requires the *last four* digits of a Social Security number. This seemingly small change introduces a significant vulnerability, opening the door to potential inaccuracies and manipulation.
Data reveals a disturbing trend: a shockingly high percentage of voter identity verifications through HAVV – 28% and even 58% in some instances – don’t match. This raises serious questions about the integrity of the system and the potential for ineligible individuals to be registered to vote.
Both SSOLV and HAVV are products of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), a non-profit organization that essentially acts as a technology provider for state motor vehicle and law enforcement agencies. States enter into agreements with AAMVA for these services, often purchasing SSOLV and HAVV as a single, bundled package.
The process for handling voter applications adds another layer of complexity. Unlike driver’s license applications typically handled individually, voter applications often arrive in batches from county recorders to the Secretary of State, then to the MVA, and finally to the Social Security Administration for verification – often at night. This batch processing introduces delays and potential for errors.
A 2010 report from the Social Security Administration’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) exposed a glaring problem: rampant resubmissions of the same voter information. In some states, 30-70% of HAVV requests were duplicates. One Illinois man was verified a staggering 342 times in a single day. The OIG found instances of individuals being submitted for verification repeatedly, even after their death.
The report detailed how one Ohio man was submitted for verification 1,778 times over eleven days in 2008, and then another 13,824 times in 2009. Crucially, this man had been deceased for four years. The OIG’s findings highlighted a systemic issue: individuals could be processed multiple times a year, raising serious concerns about data integrity.
Astonishingly, six out of ten states questioned by the OIG admitted they didn’t understand *why* these resubmissions were happening, and, more disturbingly, didn’t seem to care. While some states attributed the issue to data updates, the sheer volume of repeated submissions remained unexplained and unaddressed.
Despite the OIG’s findings, the Social Security Administration concluded that creating a system to detect and prevent these repeated submissions wasn’t necessary. And, remarkably, over a decade later, no significant improvements have been made to the HAVV system. Access to HAVV data remains opaque, with one Secretary of State staff member describing it as a “black box.”
AAMVA operates as a crucial intermediary, providing states with the technology and legal framework to connect with federal databases like the Social Security Administration. They establish standards, ensuring consistency across state driver’s license systems. They also collaborate with federal agencies on initiatives ranging from vehicle titling to facial recognition technology.
AAMVA’s network includes a diverse range of associate members, from established companies like 3M and State Farm to tech giants like Amazon, Google, and Apple. Notably, the list also includes organizations with clear political agendas, raising questions about potential influence and bias.
Details about AAMVA programs are largely inaccessible to the public, requiring special logins for jurisdictions and federal members. Their internal discussions, including strategies for shaping public narratives through social media, remain hidden from view. This lack of transparency fuels concerns about AAMVA’s broader agenda.
Financially, AAMVA generates roughly $54 million annually through contracts, membership dues, and grants. While some funds are allocated to travel expenses for events, the organization’s core function revolves around providing IT services, network infrastructure, and data-sharing capabilities.
AAMVA offers eight distinct verification services, covering everything from driver’s licenses and passports to voter registration and lawful status. However, the glaring disparity between the accuracy of SSOLV and HAVV begs the question: why hasn’t AAMVA prioritized fixing the flawed voter verification system?
The roots of HAVV trace back to the Help America Vote Act of 2002. Initial attempts to commission a feasibility report on using Social Security numbers for voter verification were abandoned, and the task was eventually passed to the Social Security Administration, which declined to participate. The resulting program, launched years later, was fundamentally flawed from the start.
The OIG’s 2010 report concluded that the Election Assistance Commission needed to complete the long-delayed feasibility study and inform Congress about the “risks of providing a high rate of false positives or false negatives to the states.” Yet, the system remains vulnerable, raising profound questions about the security and integrity of our elections.
With its vast resources, technological expertise, and powerful industry partners, why has AAMVA seemingly ignored the critical need to improve HAVV? Is a purposefully broken system creating opportunities for manipulation, or is something more insidious at play?
