A new State Department report alleges that Cuba has built a network of American activist organizations capable of rapid mobilization against U.S. policy. Officials cite a publicly distributed protest plan as evidence of this effort.
The June "National Rapid Response Plan" was circulated by a U.S.-based coalition of more than 60 organizations. The State Department links the coalition to a Cuban government entity sanctioned in June for allegedly supporting intelligence activities.
The plan calls for "coordinated nationwide actions" within 24 hours of a U.S. military attack on Cuba or an imminent threat of one. Its stated goal is to make it "politically and materially costly for the U.S. government to wage war on Cuba."
Demonstrations would begin at 6 p.m. local time on the day of any U.S. action before 3 p.m. Eastern, or at 6 p.m. the following day if later. Organizers are directed to gather at federal buildings, military sites, ICE facilities, and optionally at sports arenas during major events.
The State Department describes the materials as proof of Cuba's "continuing reach, coordination and sophistication" inside the United States. The plan also directs activists to a database mapping more than 1,300 U.S. military and law-enforcement locations.
The coalition promotes the plan openly as part of a "No War on Cuba" campaign. It works closely with the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples, described in the report as the central hub of Cuba's international influence operation.
That entity is led by a former member of a Cuban intelligence ring that operated in the 1990s and served 15 years in a U.S. prison. The report claims it coordinates more than 2,000 solidarity organizations across 150 countries.
The report highlights six organizations spanning Cuban government outreach and American activism. U.S.-based groups include an anti-war organization, a New York activist center, a socialist political group, and a progressive legal association.
Several are listed as coalition members alongside other left-wing organizations. The report argues their overlapping relationships give Cuba access to a broad activist infrastructure, though the extent of each group's role in the plan is unclear.
One socialist group is noted to have sent delegations to Cuba, including a 2023 meeting with the Cuban president, but the report states it was not created or controlled by Cuban intelligence. Another is described as a hub connecting Cuba advocacy with anti-ICE and pro-Palestinian activism.
The report does not announce sanctions or legal action against U.S. groups. Its central conclusion is that Cuba blends espionage, advocacy, and ideological influence into a single long-term campaign.
The administration has expanded pressure in 2026 through executive orders and sanctions on foreign entities tied to the Cuban economy. A separate federal investigation is examining the financial network of a major benefactor of one activist group, though the group itself has not been charged.
Treasury officials have also sought information about a March humanitarian convoy to Cuba. The group involved denied wrongdoing and said it delivered aid amid shortages on the island.
