Deep within secure laboratories across the United States, a chilling experiment is underway. Government-funded scientists are actively cultivating colonies of exotic Hyalomma ticks – imported directly from Africa – to study a terrifying virus: Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). This disease, with a mortality rate as high as 30%, has never been detected on American soil, yet researchers are deliberately introducing it for study.
The stated goal is to develop mRNA vaccines and understand how CCHF might transmit through livestock. But a growing chorus of experts is sounding the alarm, warning that this high-stakes research carries an unacceptable risk: a catastrophic lab leak. Such an event could unleash the brutal virus upon the nation, devastating both agriculture and public health.
Multiple facilities are involved in this controversial program. The USDA’s Agricultural Research Service in Manhattan, Kansas – linked to the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility – is a key player, alongside researchers at UC Davis in California and Texas Tech in Lubbock, Texas. These sites are meticulously building tick populations to observe CCHF transmission in cattle, sheep, and goats, assessing the potential for the virus to establish itself within the U.S. ecosystem.
Investigations have revealed ten active USDA contracts dedicated to mRNA vaccine development, with a significant focus on CCHF. The research is happening in facilities with a history of high-containment research, including one formerly located on Plum Island, notorious for past studies on dangerous pathogens like Lyme disease.
CCHF, first identified in Crimea during World War II, is a particularly frightening illness. It causes severe symptoms and can spread not only from ticks to animals and humans, but also directly from person to person. Currently, there is no widely available, reliable vaccine – only an outdated Soviet-era formulation from decades ago.
Adding to the concern is the involvement of EcoHealth Alliance, the organization previously linked to controversial gain-of-function research with coronaviruses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. They received a $3.7 million Department of Defense grant to study CCHF, framed as part of “combating weapons of mass destruction.”
Critics are openly questioning the wisdom of importing a deadly disease into the heart of American agricultural hubs. Stanford science writer Kris Newby, known for her work on Lyme disease, expressed alarm at the unnecessary risk being taken. She highlighted the difficulty of controlling ticks, especially in facilities unfamiliar with handling them.
Justin Goodman, of the White Coat Waste Project, bluntly calls the program a “recipe for disaster.” He argues that deliberately introducing exotic diseases into the U.S. for animal experiments is reckless and invites outbreaks that could impact both animals and people. The potential for a leak, he insists, is far too great.
The situation is further complicated by growing concerns surrounding mRNA technology in the food supply. Voices are rising to demand transparency and the protection of “food freedom,” echoing the principles of medical freedom and informed consent. The question of whether cattle will be forced to receive mRNA vaccines is now a central point of contention.
Fundamental questions about biosafety remain unanswered. Do these laboratories even meet the stringent standards required for handling such a dangerous pathogen – BSL-3 or BSL-4 containment? Given the history of lab accidents and unintended disease transmissions, the risks appear profoundly underestimated.
This research raises serious concerns about government overreach and the potential for unintended consequences. The deliberate introduction of a foreign, deadly virus into the U.S. demands rigorous scrutiny and a thorough reevaluation of the risks involved. The stakes, quite simply, could not be higher.
