The courtroom was silent, the weight of the Constitution hanging heavy in the air. Justice Neil Gorsuch, known for his sharp intellect and direct questioning, had turned his attention to Amit Agarwal, the attorney defending the power of unelected officials within the Federal Trade Commission. The case,Trump v. Slaughter, wasn’t simply about one individual; it was a battle over the very structure of American governance.
At the heart of the dispute lay a fundamental question: could a president truly control the agencies meant to enforce the laws? For decades, Democrats had strategically populated “independent agencies” with bureaucrats shielded from presidential oversight, effectively creating a shadow government capable of enacting policy without voter approval. This arrangement, Gorsuch suggested, was a dangerous erosion of accountability.
Gorsuch relentlessly challenged Agarwal’s legal reasoning, dissecting the theory attempting to establish a “fourth branch” of government – one operating outside the traditional checks and balances. He questioned the foundation of this argument, hinting it was less a legal interpretation and more a desperate attempt to salvage a flawed precedent established in a 1935 case.
“Maybe it’s a recognition thatHumphrey’s Executorwas poorly reasoned,” Gorsuch stated, his voice resonating with conviction. “And that there is no such thing in our constitutional order as a fourth branch of government that’s quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.” The implication was clear: the current system was built on shaky ground, a legal fiction threatening the balance of power.
The Justice pressed Agarwal on the President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws. A simple question – “All the laws?” – was met with hesitation and qualification. Gorsuch wouldn’t let it go, relentlessly pursuing the point until Agarwal conceded, effectively admitting the President wasn’t obligated to oversee every action of these independent agencies.
Gorsuch then painted a stark picture of the implications. If a bureaucrat could wield significant power – imposing ruinous fines and penalties – without being accountable to the elected president, what was to prevent unchecked authority? He questioned the logic of granting greater control over minor offenses while allowing sweeping power to remain unbridled.
Agarwal attempted to anchor his argument in historical precedent, citingMarbury v. Madison. But Gorsuch wasn’t swayed, pointing out the crucial difference between constitutional principles and the “quasi” authorities invented byHumphrey’s Executor. He saw a pattern of legal maneuvering designed to circumvent the clear intent of the Founding Fathers.
The Justice expressed concern that even if the Court upheld Agarwal’s theory, it would simply open the door to endless litigation, a constant struggle to define the boundaries of this newly created “fourth branch.” He questioned whether decades of relative peace regarding these agencies were simply a result of a lack of challenge, not inherent stability.
Gorsuch’s final remarks were particularly pointed. He suggested the entire framework of independent agencies was a problematic attempt to “backfill” a poorly reasoned decision. The Supreme Court, it seemed, was poised to confront a fundamental question about the nature of power and accountability in the United States.
The courtroom held its breath, sensing a potential shift in the landscape of American governance. The fate of these powerful, unelected bodies hung in the balance, and Justice Gorsuch had made his position unequivocally clear.
