For decades, China has been meticulously constructing a formidable land-based missile force, a silent arsenal designed to deter the United States from intervening in a potential conflict over Taiwan. Today, U.S. officials reveal this force doesn’t just threaten Taiwan – it casts a shadow over every major airfield, port, and military installation throughout the Western Pacific.
As Washington urgently strives to develop its own long-range firepower, a critical oversight has emerged. Analysts warn the land domain – the very ground beneath our feet – has become the most underestimated, and potentially decisive, element in a future U.S.-China confrontation. This isn’t a war of tanks and troop movements, but a high-stakes contest of missile ranges, secure basing, and the ability to endure the initial, devastating barrage.
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has amassed an unprecedented inventory of short, medium, and long-range missiles. These weapons can now reach across the first, and increasingly, the second island chains, effectively creating a zone of denial for U.S. forces. For years, China acknowledged its limitations in achieving air superiority in direct aerial combat.
The Rocket Force became the ingenious solution: a massive, land-based firepower intended to cripple U.S. bases and keep American aircraft and ships from even entering the fight. Rather than attempting to dominate the skies directly, China focused on denying access, building a network of ground launchers designed to overwhelm any defense. This resulted in the world’s largest theater-range missile stockpile, concealed within hardened underground facilities and employing rapid “shoot-and-scoot” tactics.
Despite China’s numerical advantage, the U.S. maintains crucial strengths in targeting and survivability. American missiles – Tomahawks, SM-6s, and emerging hypersonic weapons – are integrated into a sophisticated global surveillance network that the PLARF cannot yet replicate. This network relies on satellites, undersea sensors, stealth drones, and decades of accumulated combat experience.
A key difference lies in real-world experience. China hasn’t engaged in a major conflict since the 1970s, revealing challenges in coordinating operations across different military branches. The U.S., conversely, has been actively building multi-domain task forces, seamlessly integrating cyber, space, electronic warfare, and precision strikes – a level of coordination China has yet to demonstrate.
However, the U.S. faces an immediate and pressing problem: a dwindling missile stockpile. Current estimates suggest that in a conflict over Taiwan, American long-range munitions would be exhausted within a week. Washington is now aggressively expanding production of ground-launched weapons, including Typhon launchers and precision strike missiles, aiming to hold Chinese forces at risk from significantly greater distances.
The shift is gaining momentum. The U.S. is procuring anti-ship missiles at an unprecedented rate, recognizing the critical need to counter China’s growing naval capabilities. By 2035, the U.S. aims to field roughly 15,000 long-range anti-ship missiles, a dramatic increase from the current 2,500.
China’s strategy centers on overwhelming U.S. bases early in a conflict. The U.S. response relies on layered air defenses – Patriot batteries protecting airfields, THAAD interceptors engaging ballistic missiles, and Aegis-equipped destroyers intercepting threats far from shore. But analysts emphasize the need for a more diverse and affordable range of missile defenses.
A significant U.S. advantage lies in its ability to launch long-range strikes from submarines. These vessels can fire cruise missiles from virtually anywhere in the Western Pacific, remaining undetected and invulnerable to Chinese fire – a capability China currently lacks. Command integration is another area where the U.S. excels, routinely conducting multi-domain operations that seamlessly connect air, sea, cyber, space, and ground-based forces.
Alliances represent a crucial advantage for the United States. Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and South Korea provide vital depth, intelligence sharing, logistical support, and potential launch points. China lacks a comparable network of partners, limiting its operational reach. In a missile war, accuracy, integration, and survivability often outweigh sheer volume – areas where the U.S. still holds significant advantages.
Geography is at the heart of this competition. Missiles are only as effective as the locations from which they can be launched, and China’s ability to project power beyond its coastline remains constrained. The U.S. faces its own challenges, requiring diplomatic agreements to secure basing for its long-range fires. Recent agreements with the Philippines, alongside strengthened cooperation with Japan and Australia, demonstrate a push to position American launchers strategically.
A potential U.S.-China land conflict wouldn’t resemble traditional warfare. The decisive factor will be the ability of missile units on both sides to fire, relocate, and fire again before being targeted. China has invested heavily in survivability, dispersing its brigades across underground bunkers, tunnels, and hardened sites, enabling rapid relocation. U.S. launchers in the Pacific would face intense surveillance and missile attacks, necessitating a renewed focus on deception, mobility, and hardened infrastructure.
A critical question for the U.S. is whether to strike missile bases on the Chinese mainland. Such action risks escalation, while inaction carries operational costs. While defending Taiwan without striking mainland bases is possible, it would concede a significant advantage to China. The challenge lies in defining the boundaries of conflict and accepting the inherent trade-offs in the nuclear age.
Ultimately, this competition won’t be fought by massed armies, but by a missile war shaped by geography, alliances, and survivability. The side that can sustain fire the longest will control the land domain – and potentially determine the outcome of a conflict in the Pacific. For the U.S., the path forward is clear: build more long-range missiles, secure the necessary basing, and ensure the survival of its launchers under fire.
