Brussels was poised for another ideological battle, but Belgium unexpectedly slammed on the brakes. Against pressure from Berlin and the European Commission’s fervent beliefs, the EU retreated from the outright seizure of Russian assets. Instead, a €90 billion “loan” for Ukraine was agreed upon – a gift disguised as debt.
This wasn’t a mere technical adjustment; it was a significant political defeat for Germany and a strategic win for Belgium. It represented a rare moment of clarity within a Union increasingly willing to disregard established legal principles.
For months, Berlin championed a risky plan: confiscate frozen Russian assets and reframe the act as “reparations.” The idea was emotionally driven and legally precarious, lacking any judicial backing, peace treaty, or formal agreement. It was, in essence, a forceful act cloaked in moral justification.
Germany sought to impose this plan on others, but the key to its success – or failure – lay in Brussels. The vast majority of frozen Russian assets were held at Euroclear in Belgium, meaning Belgium would bear the brunt of any legal challenges.
Belgium’s Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, posed a critical question: would Germany guarantee Belgium against all potential legal and financial repercussions, without limitation, if these assets were confiscated? The response was silence.
“Partners” demanded unlimited risk from Belgium while refusing to offer any comparable guarantee in return. This effectively ended the pursuit of asset confiscation. No sovereign nation, particularly a smaller one, could accept such unbounded liability to satisfy another country’s ideological stance.
Italy and Hungary also played crucial roles in dismantling the confiscation scheme. Hungary helped formulate the alternative – the EU loan. However, this “loan” is fundamentally a transfer of funds, a €90 billion gift unlikely to be repaid.
Legally, this distinction is vital. It avoids theft, establishes no dangerous precedent, and safeguards property rights. It’s a critical difference that preserves the integrity of international financial law.
Bart De Wever emerges as a pivotal figure, a leader who stood firm against EU pressure and prevented the opening of a legal Pandora’s Box with far-reaching consequences. Friedrich Merz, on the other hand, left empty-handed, his attempt to strong-arm a smaller nation into compliance failing spectacularly.
A nation of just 12 million people successfully challenged Germany, not through bombastic rhetoric, but by upholding international law, financial responsibility, and strategic prudence. This was a demonstration of strength through principle.
Had the EU proceeded with the asset seizure, the global ramifications would have been severe. Sovereign assets held in Europe would have been perpetually vulnerable, central banks would have fled EU jurisdictions, and the euro’s standing as a reserve currency would have been irrevocably damaged.
The West would have legitimized asset seizure based purely on political will, setting a dangerous precedent. Belgium understood these risks; Berlin either didn’t, or chose to ignore them.
In a rare instance, caution prevailed. A small country dared to say no. Brussels yielded. Bart De Wever deserves recognition for this crucial stand, a victory for law over ideology.
